This paper evaluates the impact that CEO incentive compensation has on firm performance. CEO incentives and firm performance are interrelated, making empirical identification difficult. To circumvent this problem, I focus on changes in CEO incentives caused by stock price movements. Using a return index for each firm's peer group and lagged CEO holdings, I form an estimate of the changes in CEO incentives from exogenous market movements. With this estimate and an appropriate dummy-variable specification, the relationship between incentives and performance is identified. For the median incentive level, firm value, as measured by Tobin's q, increases by 3.7% compared to that of counterfactual firms that lack CEO incentive compensation. I link incentives with corporate governance, showing that incentives combat inefficiencies created by governance mechanisms that reduce the CEO's financial risk. Finally, I introduce an ex ante measure of the amount of discretion the executive has over her incentive portfolio and show that the greater this discretion the less incentives mitigate agency conflicts.
Introduction
The empirical relationship between incentives and firm performance is a foundational issue in corporate finance. Whether incentives actually create value has been a subject of debate in the empirical literature. This paper quantifies how much incentives (positively) impact firm value using an empirical approach that carefully addresses endogeneity between incentives and performance. My results suggest an economically meaningful reduction in agency conflicts from observed CEO incentive contracts. When firm performance is measured by Tobin's q, the ratio of firm value to replacement value, median CEO incentives increase firm value by 3.7% over counterfactual companies that lack CEO incentive compensation.
Moreover, I examine the efficacy of incentives under varying levels of corporate governance quality and different CEO incentive-portfolio structures. Using Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) governance measures, I find that incentives can address inefficiencies when poor corporate governance reduces the CEO's pecuniary risk. Such risk reduction may arise through mechanisms that provide golden parachutes or limit CEO indemnity. Also, I introduce an intuitive, ex ante measure of the discretion the CEO has over her private incentive portfolio through option-exercise policy and voluntary transactions in company stock. I show that the marginal value of incentives is inversely related to the discretion a CEO exercises over her company stock and option holdings.
The econometric challenge of quantifying the relationship between firm performance and CEO incentives is demonstrated by contradictory findings in the existing literature. Early work did not address estimation issues that arise when ownership and performance are endogenously determined. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence against the BerleMeans thesis, which contends that executives with small ownership stakes in firms would have reduced incentives to maximize firm profits. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) directly investigate the role of management ownership in creating value. They find a non-monotonic relationship between ownership and value.
Later papers confront the estimation issues that arise when ownership and performance are endogenously determined. However, the results are determined, to a large degree, by the choice of empirical model. Papers with fixed-effects panels often find no link between management ownership and performance (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999, Palia 2001) .
Palia controls for endogenous incentive levels through four instrumental variables: CEO experience, CEO education quality, CEO age, and firm volatility. He finds no statistical relationship between incentive compensation and firm value, suggesting that firms are in equilibrium when CEO contracts are set. Countering this branch of research, Zhou (2001) contends that the relationship between management ownership and performance can only be found in the cross-sectional model. Thus, fixed-effects models eliminate important heterogeneity and give the specious result that ownership and performance are not related.
My empirical methodology provides an improved approach to identification over those used previously. It addresses endogeneity between CEO incentives and firm performance, while accounting for fixed effects. The approach emphasizes the importance of changes in CEO incentives. CEOs are rewarded for good firm performance, whether from skill or luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), so it is not possible to infer that incentives help firm performance merely by observing that the two are positively correlated.
Instead, successful identification requires isolating exogenous changes in CEO incentives.
Incentives are established through equity-linked securities. Therefore, by observing stock price movements, it is possible to estimate changes in CEO incentives as a function of both the structure of the incentive portfolio and stock returns. Unfortunately, if the market is forward looking, stock returns may anticipate future performance innovations and estimated changes will be endogenous. To combat this issue, for each CEO I create an index of the stock returns of her firm's competitors. Multiplying the returns on this index by lagged information on CEO portfolios creates a valid instrument for changes in incentives.
Two identification assumptions are necessary for the instrument to be valid. First, I assume that the CEO's incentive portfolio does not predict firm performance innovations indefinitely. I allow for incentives to predict firm performance innovations, perhaps due to inside information. But, there is a finite period over which incentives are correlated with performance innovations.
Second, I exploit the panel structure of my data and assign firms to economic groups and subgroups. I assume that, after controlling for a time-varying group mean, firm specific performance shocks are independent within subgroups. Given this assumption, a performance shock for a specific firm will be independent of the excess stock return of a peer in the same subgroup. Returns of firms within the subgroup will be correlated due to shared economic drivers and can be used to compute an exogenous return index. This approach is similar to identification techniques used in Hausman (1997) and Nevo (2001) . In the main text, I
assume that the market's average Tobin's q changes each year, which is captured econometrically by dummy variables for each sample year. I construct instruments using the returns of a CEO's competitor firms in the same economic sector.
The definition of groups is critical for valid identification. I use robustness tests to ensure that the modeled structure of time-varying performance means does not determine the results. Using a taxonomy that classifies firms, I run tests assuming the time-varying means exist, in increasing specificity, at the sector, industry group, and industry level. The instruments must be defined such that dummy-variables capturing time-varying means do not weaken their identification power. Therefore, when computing return instruments, I use a firm's industry group peers when shocks to means are assumed to occur at the sector level, industry peers when shocks to means are assumed to occur at the industry group level, and sub-industry peers when shocks to means are assumed to occur at the industry level.
Recent papers have examined the impact of incentives on firm value using alternate econometric approaches. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) regress changes in Tobin's q on lagged changes in managerial ownership. Treating the lagged change in ownership as exogenous, Fahlenbrach and Stulz find that the elasticity of q with respect to ownership is approximately one. While my empirical approach uses a similar difference-in-difference specification for estimation, I provide instruments for changes in CEO incentives and eliminate the need to assume lagged changes in CEO incentives are exogenous. Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) consider a large sample of U.S. firms. They employ stochas-tic frontier analysis to derive the hypothetical maximum value for a firm. They find that the average Tobin's q is 16% below the optimal, which would be realized by first-best contracting. In other research, Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) examine firms that are 100% owned by management. These firms, which do not have agency costs, are benchmarks against which other companies are valued. However, since the benchmark firm is required, their study is limited to small companies. Habib and Ljungqvist and Ang, Cole, and Lin measure the distance between observed and optimal firm values. By contrast, my work is unconcerned with finding the optimal firm value. Instead, I quantify the value created by incentives in observed firms from counterfactual benchmark firms that lack incentive compensation.
A discussion of the measure of incentives, the empirical approach, and identification follows in section 2. Section 3 summarizes the data and reviews the choice of control variables.
The value of CEO incentives is analyzed in section 4. The interaction of incentives with corporate governance is examined in Section 5. Section 5.2 quantifies how CEO hedging significantly changes the value of incentives from an investor's perspective. Robustness tests are contained in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Incentives, endogeneity, and identification A large literature exists linking economic environments with optimal incentive measures.
These theoretical models generally show that total CEO wealth is a major determinant of CEO behavior and incentives. Accordingly, I focus on the elasticity of CEO wealth to firm performance as my measure of incentives.
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) solve for optimal incentive levels in an economy that features both talent assignment and moral hazard. Their model allows for a critical analysis of three definitions of wealth-performance elasticity used in the literature: (i) the dollar change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in firm value ($-$ incentives; e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990, Hall and Liebman 1998), (ii) the dollar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm value ($-% incentives; e.g. Hall and Liebman 1998), and (iii) the percentage change in CEO compensation wealth for a percentage change in firm value (%-% incentives). Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier show that if CEO utility is multiplicative in effort, %-% incentives are independent of firm size. Their empirical evidence strongly confirms the model's precise predictions on how each incentive measure scales with firm size.
Therefore, I use the %-% wealth-performance elasticity 1 to measure incentives. This ensures that incentives are not a proxy for firm size in empirical tests. CEO incentive exposure, B, is defined as
Here, incentives are the dollar change in wealth, scaled by annual total compensation, for a percentage change in firm value.
2 Ideally, it would be possible to compute B using information on total CEO wealth. However, total wealth is not observable in data for the United States due to data limitations.
Only changes in incentive wealth may be observed. These are estimated using the CEO's holdings in performance-linked securities, such as stock or stock options. Utility gains from expected compensation in the future are ignored. Research suggests that the primary source of CEO incentives is from existing securities, not from future salary increases (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003, Hall and Liebman 1998) . Hence, the approximation of changes in total wealth by changes in incentive wealth should induce little error.
Equation (1) implies that a feasible calculation in the data is
where ∆ BS is the total Black-Scholes delta from option and stock exposure and S is the stock price. The Black-Scholes delta is the elasticity of the CEO's incentive portfolio value to the underlying stock price. Total annual compensation is used as a proxy for scaling by CEO wealth as in Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier. 
Endogeneity
Consider a model of the relationship between current levels of CEO incentives, B, and future firm performance, y, in a simple predictive regression. Firm performance may follow a dynamic process. Let X i,t be a vector of control variables for performance for CEO-firm i at time t. Assume that at time t, the CEO receives a contract that specifies an incentive level B i,t . Then the performance process for firm i in economic group j may be written
where η i is a fixed effect for CEO-firm combination i, φ j,t+1 is a time varying group mean common to all firms in economic group j, and i,t+1 is an idiosyncratic innovation to performance. α allows for a dynamic performance process. Performance processes are modeled as dynamic only when empirical evidence indicates that such a model is appropriate. When it is not appropriate, the restricted model with α = 0 is used.
Firm performance and CEO compensation are determined simultaneously. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show that CEOs are rewarded for shocks to performance, even random shocks. Therefore, incentives B t and innovations in performance t will be correlated. Incentives may even anticipate performance innovations if, for example, the board has inside information on an innovation to operating income at t + 1 and increases CEO incentives at t. Such a possibility creates endogeneity between incentives at t and t + 1 performance innovations. Additionally, the data used to compute B t consists of data at t and data located between t and t + 1. 3 Therefore, B t and t+1 are endogenous by construction.
Identification
Identification of equation (3) begins by removing the fixed effect η i using a first-difference transformation. The first differenced performance process is:
The economic coefficient relating incentives and firm performance is β. From the logic presented earlier, it must be that ∆B i,t is endogenous with ∆ i,t+1 . Therefore, identification requires finding an instrument for changes in incentives ∆B i,t .
Changes in incentives can be created by several activities, such as stock price movements, trading by the CEO, and recontracting. Recontracting and trading by the CEO are surely endogenous and related to firm performance innovations. A natural area to look for exogenous changes in incentives is through the stock price movement channel. I first define the expression for estimated change in incentives from stock returns ζ and then show how a similar measure Z satisfies exclusion restrictions.
Incentives are established through equity-linked securities. Therefore, stock returns provide information about how incentives evolve over time. Let ζ i,t−1,t be the approximate, observable change in incentives from t − 1 to t due to stock-price movements. Differentiate the definition of incentives (2) with respect to S to find the sensitivity of incentives to stock prices. Multiplying this sensitivity by observed changes in stock prices gives the estimated change in incentives. Rewriting the resulting expression in terms of stock returns r t−1,t from t − 1 to t yields
where γ BS is the total Black-Scholes gamma from option exposure. By definition γ is the second derivative of option price with respect to the underlying stock price. The form of ζ shows that changes to incentives from stock returns depend on the composition of the incentive portfolio. Changes in incentives are linear in level with an adjustment (γ/∆ · S) for option convexity.
Unfortunately, ζ t−1,t cannot instrument ∆B t . If returns anticipate innovations in performance, then r t−1,t will be correlated with future innovations. Moreover, the variables related to incentives, B, γ, and ∆, are endogenous by the earlier discussion.
It is possible to instrument ∆B t if the exogenous change in CEO incentives is isolated.
To create such an instrument, two identification assumptions are necessary. First, I assume that incentives at t − 1 are independent of the performance innovation at t + 1. This will occur in equilibrium, for example, if there is no inside information. Under this assumption, all variables that derive from incentive data at time t − 1, B t−1 , γ t−1 , and ∆ t−2 , will be independent of t+1 .
Second, I exploit the panel structure of my data and assign firms to economic groups and subgroups. I assume that, after controlling for a time-varying group mean (φ j,t+1 in equation (3)), firm specific performance shocks are independent within subgroups. Given this assumption, a performance shock for a specific firm will be independent of the stock return of a peer in the same subgroup. Returns of firms within the subgroup will be correlated due to shared economic drivers and can be used to compute instrumental variables. This approach is similar to identification techniques used in Hausman (1997) and Nevo (2001) .
Using the two assumptions above, I create an instrument for changes in CEO incentives.
For each firm, I identify companies in the sample with the same business focus. Let r −i t−1,t be the equally weighted average of these company returns, excluding firm i, computed with monthly rebalancing. 4 I use information about the CEO's portfolio at t − 2 to create a valid instrument for changes in CEO incentives. This instrument Z is given by
Finally, endogenous control variables in X must be instrumented to ensure that their presence does not bias the estimate of β. Lagged levels of these variables are used to instrument changes as discussed in Section 4. Note that while it may be possible to instrument changes in CEO incentives with lagged incentive levels, the instrument Z is stronger and provides for more effective estimation.
Data
The core information on CEOs and compensation structure is taken Economic group definitions are per GICS as provided through Compustat. In increasing 5 CEOs are not always flagged for all fiscal years during their tenure. This is remedied by filling in missing identifiers, where appropriate.
6 Beginning with 2006, reporting requirements were changed so that companies must provide detailed information on all executive option positions. This comprehensive data is available in Execucomp. I use the older, more opaque data format in order maximize the time frame of this study.
7 http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm degree of specificity, each company is categorized by sector, industry group, industry, and subindustry. Occasionally, the classification of a company may switch for a year and then return to the original classification. This is corrected as necessary. In order to compute %-% incentives B for each CEO-fiscal year observation, a proxy for CEO total wealth is required. Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) use total compensation as this proxy. However, established CEOs may receive low total compensation in a year, but have large existing stock and option holdings. In such a case, total compensation does not accurately represent wealth. For example, in the data, scaling by total annual compensation yields a median incentive of ten but a maximum of two billion.
Therefore, I use a CEO compensation value fitted from cross-sectional analysis to scale total portfolio delta. Doing so reduces the influence of outliers and may provide a better proxy for wealth than actual CEO compensation. Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) predict that log compensation scales at a rate of 1 /3 to log firm value. Compensation includes salary, cash bonus, stock and option awards, and other forms of remuneration. Theory predicts that compensation is also subject to a hidden reference firm size. I use the cross-section of total compensation to derive a fitted compensation level for each CEO-year observation.
Specifically, I estimate the regression
where the time fixed-effect a t captures the hidden reference firm size. In the data, b has a point estimate of 0.321 and a standard error of 0.0144. Therefore, the coefficient from the regression conforms to theory. I use the fitted compensation values from this regression,
to scale Delta exposure and define %-% incentives
where ∆ BS is the total Black-Scholes Delta of the portfolio, S is the underlying stock price, and Compensation F itted is the fitted total annual compensation implied from regression equation (7).
Execucomp collects the incentive portfolio data from each company's annual proxy statement (DEF14A). Option ownership details are as of fiscal year end. However, share ownership is reported as of a day between the fiscal year end and the filing of the proxy statement, which may be filed up to 120 days after fiscal year end. Therefore, the incentive measure combines two distinct observation times for each CEO-year in the sample. Since an observation on the total level of incentives for a fiscal year includes up to four months of information about the executive's portfolio decisions in the next fiscal year, time-t incentives are endogenous to both t and t + 1. This is addressed appropriately during estimation.
Model selection
Optimal contracting through incentive compensation exists to reduce agency costs. Therefore, if agency costs destroy value and markets are efficient, the benefit of incentives should be seen directly in improved firm value and increased operating income. I focus on firm value as characterized by Tobin's q, defined as the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets. I use operating income before depreciation normalized by the start of year net capital. Please note that precise definitions of all variables, as well as the fields for computing them within Compustat, are listed in Table 1 .
To control for firm value, I follow the guidelines established by Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) CEO incentive portfolio wealth is sensitive to firm performance for the period covered by the sample. The median CEO has %-% incentives B of 10.3. Thus, a 1% increase in firm value results in the median CEO wealth increasing by 10% of annual salary. The average B is 21.9, indicating that some CEOs have their wealth tightly tied to firm performance.
Descriptive statistics
The firms in the sample have an average value to replacement cost, Tobin's q, of 2.00.
Operating income is, on average, equal to 90% of capital. The median firm has a net profit margin of 4.4% and a return on assets of 4.9%. The average values are brought down to 2.0% and 3.2%, respectively, indicating that there are several firms with poor performance in the sample. The average firm stock returned 15% over the sample and had an annualized standard deviation of 47%.
Finally, the firms in the sample expend on average 11% of their asset on capital expenditures annually. While the average spending is 4% of assets each for R&D and acquisitions, the median firms engage in neither research and development nor acquisitions. Thus, acquisitive firms and firms with high research budgets represent a minority in the sample.
The average value of CEO incentives
Executive incentives cannot be considered as strictly exogenous from corporate performance.
Strict exogeneity requires that all firm-value innovations are uncorrelated with all incentive levels, past and future. However, in general settings, performance and incentives are simultaneously determined. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) show how manager pay is influenced by luck. Performance also has a feedback effect in which current shocks to performance affect future incentives. An example of this is shown by Core and Guay (1999) , who find that companies adjust grants to offset deviations from sample averages. Endogeneity and feedback must be directly addressed through the econometric technique.
Estimation
I use a weaker assumption than strict exogeneity in the empirical specification. Instead, I assume that incentives, controls, and returns do not predict innovations, but may be determined endogenously with current innovations or react to past innovations. This is a sequential exogeneity assumption: independent variables that precede the innovation at t are viewed as uncorrelated with the innovation. However, any correlation between a current innovation and current and future values of the independent variables is allowed. Sequential exogeneity is a weaker, more reasonable assumption than the strict exogeneity assumption required by random-and fixed-effects panels. For more detail on the sequential exogeneity assumptions, please see Appendix A.1.
The full specification for performance (3), including control variables, is
To eliminate the fixed-effects, I take first differences. Estimation then proceeds using GMM.
Changes in incentives, ∆B i,t , are instrumented by contemporaneous changes computed using the instrument Z as described in Section 2.2. This identifies β in equation (8). For all other variables, lagged levels instrument first differences during estimation. If sequential exogeneity assumptions are satisfied, these level instruments identify the remaining coefficients. The precise moment condition definitions are detailed as assumptions (11) and (12) This approach, due to Arellano and Bond (1991), addresses problems caused by endogeneous variables and feedback. Since lagged levels are used as instruments, innovations to performance influencing current and future incentives and other controls does not bias estimation. By contrast, panel data methods, such as random-and fixed-effects models, necessarily assume strict exogeneity. If performance innovations systematically influence future incentive levels, estimation will be biased. This bias will not disappear even with large cross-sections. Arellano and Bond estimation allows for consistent estimation of panels under sequential exogeneity like the one studied here, which have short timeframes but a large number of cross-section units.
To illustrate the method, consider empirical specification (8). After first differencing, the equation for estimation contains the innovation term (ψ i,t+1 − ψ i,t ). Provided that the basic error ψ is serially uncorrelated, then, under sequential exogeneity, all right-hand-side level variables up through t − 1 are uncorrelated with the differenced error. If ψ exhibits first-order serial correlation, then right-hand-side variables prior to and including t − 2 are uncorrelated. These facts allows for the construction of a sufficient number of moment conditions in which level variables are used as instruments for the differenced variables in the estimation equation.
The critical assumption on the order of serial correlation in ψ is tested empirically. Under the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors ψ, first differenced errors should not display second-order serial correlation. 8 The M 2 test evaluates a null on no second-order serial correlation in first-differenced errors. When it rejects the null, the sequential exogeneity assumptions are adjusted, shifting the right-hand-side level instruments back one time period.
The M 3 tests a null in which the non-differenced errors have first-order serial correlation, in which case differenced errors should not exhibit third-order serial correlation. As stated before, when exhibits first-order serial correlation, the moment conditions in GMM are adjusted accordingly. Reported standard errors are robust to the observed serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
In general, effective estimation with Arellano and Bond (1991) requires that lagged levels of a variable are good instruments for first differences. Since incentives are persistent, lagged levels of B are poor instruments for changes in B. As discussed in detail in Appendix A.2, existing solutions to the problems raised by persistent incentive levels (Ahn and Schmidt Therefore, the instrumentation technique used here, where Z identifies exogenous changes in incentives, is necessary for estimation. Table 3 presents results of estimating the performance process, equation (8), with annual fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) report results for Tobin's q. The estimated process for operating income is shown in columns (3) and (4). Columns (2) and (4) use the full set of controls. Corporate performance, as measured by Tobin's q and operating income, is improved by incentives, as predicted by traditional contracting theory. Tobin's q shows a strong positive statistical relationship with incentives at greater than 95% confidence when the full set of controls is used. Operating income has a strong association with incentives, a z-statistic of 2.12, when the full set of controls are included in the predictive regression.
Panel results
For each process, I evaluated both dynamic and static models. The process forms in Table 3 represent the outcome of model tests in which I chose the appropriate form for each measure of firm performance. Tobin's q did not have a statistically meaningful relationship with lagged values after controlling for a time-varying annual mean, so the process was modeled as non-dynamic. On the other hand, operating income is clearly a dynamic process.
The coefficient on lagged operating income is significant, with a z-statistic over 4.
Controls enter the regressions as expected. Log sales proxy for firm size and diminishing returns to scales. Increased sales are associated with lower Tobin's q and lower operating income. R&D is positively associated with Tobin's q, suggesting that it captures growth opportunities valued by the market, while R&D expenses directly reduce operating income as seen in the results.
Note that market efficiency does not suggest that incentives are unrelated to value. Market efficiency focuses on returns, i.e., changes in firm value. However, these predictive regressions focus on levels. The empirical technique in this paper uses instrumented changes in incentives for identification. As this approach isolates non-anticipated shocks, a positive relationship between incentives and value should be expected based on predictions of contracting theory.
How much CEO incentives matter
Executive incentives exist to mitigate agency conflicts. I define the value of incentives against a counterfactual benchmark in which executives have no incentive exposure. This counterfactual assumes that the executive is compensated with a fixed salary, thereby maximizing agency costs. The value of incentives then represents the amount of agency costs eliminated by second-best contracting.
By the definition above, the value of incentives is simply β × B for a given incentive level
The distribution of incentive levels is skewed as shown in Table 2 . I use the median and median values in the sample, B = 10.3 and B = 21.9, as reasonable incentive levels for a typical CEO. Table 4 shows that incentives have an economically meaningful role in improving firm performance. For the median incentive level, Tobin's q increases by 0.073, which is a 3.7% improvement in the mean level. Average incentive levels make a more significant different, increasing firm value by 8.8%. Operating income also improves from incentives. The operating income-to-capital ratio increased by 0.004 for the median incentive level, which is a 6.3% increase in the mean operating income-to-capital.
When are incentives most effective?
Incentives increase the CEO's financial exposure to company performance. Doing so encourages the CEO to exert more effort and strive to increase firm value. However, there are other mechanisms in place that impact CEO financial risk. For example, golden parachutes compensate CEOs on their departure from a firm, effectively limiting their downside financial risk. Additionally, CEOs may trade in their incentive portfolios, exercising options and selling stock, which will change their incentive levels. In this section, I study how incen-tives interact with mechanisms that affect financial risk. Specifically, I focus on corporate governance and the structure of the CEO's incentive portfolio.
Incentives and corporate governance
When corporate governance weakens the link between CEO wealth and firm performance, incentives should be most effective at creating value. To test this hypothesis, I use the governance indices of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick provide a summary index of total corporate governance, which is comprised on five subindices. The results in Table 5 show a statistically strong relationship between incentives and the protection index. This suggests that when CEOs have limited downside firm risk, incentives increase firm-specific risk, realigning CEO interests with those of the firm. Incentives show no meaningful relationship with the delay, voting, and other subindices. These indices account for governance mechanisms that are less directly linked to financial risk, so we should not expect to see that incentives substitute for poor governance in these cases. Finally, incentives seem to compound governance issues at the state level. This may be a result of unaccounted for endogeneity between incentive levels and state laws favoring the firm.
The results have an intuitive interpretation confirming the initial hypothesis. Incentives represent monetary risk in the firm. Governance that weakens this risk should reduce the value of incentives. The protection subindices clearly represent a reduction in the CEO's pecuniary risk. Thus, the statistical and economic significance by which incentives offset poor governance is expected. Furthermore, finding no relationship between governance and the other subindices is a logical result. In accordance with the hypothesis, these mechanisms do not directly impact financial risk and, as such, do not substitute for incentives.
CEO discretion and the value of incentives
CEOs are given large amounts of discretion over firm strategy, their level of effort, and incentives. When markets are efficient and information is perfect, a rational CEO would never choose to hold stock in her company beyond that specified by a contract. However, To understand the role of CEO discretion intuitively, consider a CEO with expectations over company stock that differ from that of the firm principals and the market. Such a CEO may hold stock voluntarily. However, if stock prices increase, the executive can take a variety of actions. Under a behavioral framework, she may view the price increase as market confirmation of her strategic choices and effort level. If she holds onto her shares, effort may not change. Alternatively, consider a rational framework for a CEO with identical expectations over company stock. If stock-price changes do not affect the CEO's outlook, then she will hedge changes to incentive levels. By hedging incentives, effort stays constant.
Under both scenarios, an increase in stock price does not automatically lead to greater incentives and higher effort as predicted by standard agency theory.
In traditional contracting frameworks, incentives exist to drive CEO effort. A CEO who exercises discretion over her private portfolio changes the implication of traditional contracting. Observed incentives represent a equilibrium level jointly determined by principal and agent. Thus, it is not reasonable to expect that the marginal value of incentives is equal for CEOs who exercise discretion over their incentive portfolio and for those CEOs that do not.
Measuring manager discretion
Let B be the total incentives from option and stock exposure. In the data, B is comprised of five segments, which represent incentives from (i) restricted stock, (ii) other company stock, It is a raw measure of the ease with which the executive may adjust her holdings in company stock (or has done so in the past). For example, this value is theoretically 0 when all of the executive's exposure comes from securities that cannot be sold. When the CEO buys stock voluntarily or retains vested options, the ratio increases.
Discretion Ratio assumes that all of the securities controlling the executive's exposure to firm risk are represented by company stock and options. However, in practice, executives have access to a large variety of financial instruments to manage their incentive exposure. The revised specification for performance is:
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(9) Table 6 , columns (1) and (2) report the relationship between incentives and Tobin's q.
Columns (3) and (4) The influence of CEO discretion on operating income is different from that of Tobin's q. Managers with significant discretion respond to increases in incentives by improving operating income. This behavior is statistically significant, with a z-statistic of 2.02, when controls are included in the regression. This results suggests further research on the channels by which CEO discretion lowers Tobin's q. One avenue may be through income generating, negative NPV projects. Opposite results are seen for operating income-to-capital at the median incentive level.
When Discretion Ratio is set to the 25 th percentile, operating income-to-capital improves by 2.9% in the mean level. As Discretion Ratio increases to the median level and to the 75 th percentile, the effectiveness of incentives increases to 4.3% and 5.6% of the mean, respectively.
As mentioned previously, the contrasting results between Tobin's q and Operating Income should be explored in greater depth. The results are consistent, however, if discretion is associated with the CEO adopting income generating, negative NPV projects.
6 Robustness tests 6.1 Alternate group mean specifications
As discussed in Section 2.2, the instrument for changes in incentives may be invalid if there is a common factor driving firm returns and the return index of competitors. In the main empirical specification, I allow for a single market-based factor. However, if firm performance shocks contain an industry-specific factor, for example, then the model is misspecified.
I performed robustness tests to account for the possibility of more precise time-varying economic cluster means. I used three different specifications: 8 time-varying sector means, 19 time-varying economic group means, and 64 time-varying industry means. Table 8 shows results using the main empirical specification, equation (8), without accounting for CEO discretion or corporate governance issues. Columns (1) and (2) of Table   8 show robustness tests when each industry has a unique, time-varying common factor. The results are robust to industry-year factors. Focusing on the specification with the full set of controls, incentives still have a positive influence on firm value, with a t-stat of 1.8. Accounting for 19 economic groups in columns (3) and (4) yields similar results, although the statistical significance is weak when the full set of control variables are used. Finally, columns (5) and (6) show the estimation when 64 time-varying industry means are used. The full specification in column (6) is statistically meaningful with 90% confidence.
Economically, the results for the full set of control variables suggest about a 30% reduction in economic magnitude over the baseline estimates of Table 4 . At a Tobin's q to incentive level sensitivity of 5.35, the median of columns (2), (4), and (6), the implied value of incentives is 2.8% and 6.8% of average Tobin's q at the median and average incentive levels, respectively.
Firm founders
Baker and Hall (2004) value the incentives owners use to motivate CEOs. They argue that founder CEOs are simultaneously principals and agents of their firms. Given this, their incentive packages may differ in systematic ways from that of professional managers brought it to established firms.
It is not clear ex ante whether the presence of firm founders distorts the implications of the results presented so far. The empirical model used in this paper is designed to account for the role CEOs have in setting their incentive levels. In this way, firm founders are simply CEOs that have significant latitude in their incentive portfolios. While the empirical specification should properly control for founders, I perform a robustness test without firm founders from the sample. To do so, I remove any CEOs whose start date in that role (field BECAMECEO in Execucomp) precedes the first return in the CRSP monthly data set. This is a rough way to remove founders, hence it is used as a robustness test. Table 9 shows the results of estimating the main specification without founders. The results are very similar to those when founders are included. Incentives have a statistically strong impact on Tobin's q and operating income. The sensitivities of performance to incentives are higher, suggesting that incentives more efficiently address agency issues for non-founders than for founders. However, the level of incentives for non-founders is lower, so the overall economic impact is similar. For the median incentive level without founders, incentives improve Tobin's q by 3.9%.
Fama-French excess return instruments
Raw returns of peers are used to compute the instrument Z. It is possible that even after accounting for sector, group, and industry time-varying means, the raw returns of peers are still correlated with a firm's idiosyncratic innovation. Results would then still be biased.
An alternate way to define the instrument Z is to use the average excess return of peers in equation (6) instead of the average raw return of peers. To do so, I use a Fama & French 3 factor market to calculate excess returns (Fama and French 1993) . The average of these excess returns for each firm's peer group is used to compute an alternate instrument.
Empirical tests with this instrument yield results with similar economic magnitudes and statistical significance. These results are omitted for brevity, but are available by request from the author.
Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impact that CEO incentive compensation has on firm performance.
To identify how incentives influence performance, I argue that it is possible to isolate exogenous changes in CEO incentives. Changes in incentives are driven by firm performance.
I show how estimating changes using the returns of peers provides a proxy for firm return in the empirical approach. This proxy is exogenous to firm performance innovations under the assumption that performance shocks are independent across firms after accounting for time-varying group performance means. Combining the peer return with lagged information on the CEO's portfolio provides a strong instrument for changes in incentives.
Incentives create significant value, defined as the value created by CEO incentivization over a counterfactual baseline environment in which incentive contracting does not exist. I find that contracting typically improves firm value, as measured by Tobin's q, by 3.7%.
I show that incentives substitute for poor levels of corporate governance in addressing agency costs. Specifically, using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick corporate governance measures, I show an intuitively appealing result: incentives substitute for governance mechanisms that lower CEO monetary risk. The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick protection index accounts for limited liability for CEOs and golden parachutes. Incentives are effective at eliminating costs when CEO protection is high.
The analysis also indicates that the role of the executive in adjusting her compensation portfolio critically changes the value of incentives. I introduce an ex ante measure of the amount of discretion the executive has over her incentive portfolio and show that the greater this discretion the less incentives mitigate agency conflicts. Accounting for this discretion, I analyze Tobin's q. For 25% of firms, the value gains from median incentive levels are significant, exceeding 4.0%. The median gain is 3.0%. 25% of firms see Tobin's q rises by less than 2.2% for median incentive levels.
A.1 Moment conditions
The moment conditions used for estimation are based on the sequential exogeneity assumptions that are tested empirically. Let B be a measure of CEO incentives, X a vector of control variables, and ψ an innovation to performance, as specified in Equation (3). Due to the computation specifics for B described in Section 3, incentives at t are endogenous with innovations at t + 1. Therefore, given the timing conventions of the model, the sequential exogeneity assumption is
Equation (11) places no restrictions on how innovations impact future performance or incentives.
After first differencing, the valid moment condition for control variables X during estimation is
As described in Sections 2.2, estimated changes in incentives using a peer return index Z instrument for changes in actual incentives ∆B. As such, I assume that
Finally, when the innovations exhibit serial correlation, the assumptions are not valid and must be adjusted. If the innovations are of order-j serial correlation, then (11) is valid only for s < t − j.
A.2 Evaluation of alternate estimation techniques
The Arellano-Bond estimator is known to have poor finite sample properties when the regressors are persistent (Blundell and Bond 1998, Blundell and Bond 2000) . In such cases, levels of the regressors are poor instruments for changes. Incentives (see section 2) are persistent. Blundell and Bond provide additional moment restrictions to improve the estimator's performance in a panel setting for a small number of observations. The critical assumption on the initial conditions required for unbiased estimation is
where η i is a fixed-effect on the performance measure, delta allows for correlation between the level of incentives and the fixed-effect and γ is the AR(1) coefficient on the dynamic process of incentives.
This condition indicates that the deviation of the initial observation of incentives, B i,1 from the steady state incentive value,
, is uncorrelated with the fixed effect. Intuitively, a sufficient condition for (13) to hold is that B i,1 is in a steady state. But, the initial observation of incentives represents a new CEO. As such, it is unlikely that the system of incentives is in a steady state.
More generally, this condition is unlikely to hold in the panel setting of this study. For example, assume that y i is a measure of firm quality. Then, a high η i indicates that the firm is of a high quality. Consider the problem facing a prospective CEO. A prospective CEO may be willing to accept a initial incentive level below the steady state value in order to price themselves attractively for the company. Similarly, a CEO looking at a bad firm may look for compensation above the steady state value in order to accept the risk of joining a poorly performing company. Under this example, moment condition (13) is negative and estimation using Blundell and Bond will be biased.
The econometric literature contains several other methods to improve the small sample properties of the Arellano-Bond estimator when regressors are persistent. These methods, do not rely on assumptions on the initial conditions, as in Blundell-Bond. Instead, they focus on assumptions on the generating process of innovations. Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tah The histograms shows the distribution of Discretion Ratio for all CEO-Fiscal year observations. Discretion Ratio is the percentage of the CEO's delta exposure in unrestricted stock and vested options to the total delta of the CEO's company holdings. Delta is defined as the dollar change in incentive package value for a dollar change in the underlying stock price and is computed per the Black-Scholes model. Windmeijer WC-robust estimator z-statistics in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The table presents summary results of the dynamic panel regression of future firm value and income on current incentive levels and controls variables. Columns (1) and (3) contains a single control, incentive level. The full set of controls are used in columns (2) and (4). During estimation, all variables are treated as endogenous and a first difference transformation is used to eliminate fixed effects. Changes in incentives are instrumented with changes estimated using a industry peer index as described in Section 2. All other variables are instrumented with lagged levels. The M 2 tests for second order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. If this test yields a high p-value, second order autocorrelation is rejected and all level variables preceeding t − 2 are valid instruments. If the original model fails the M 2 test, it is subjected to a M 3 test, which checks for third order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. Passing this test indicates that all level variables preceeding t − 3 are valid instruments. Z-statistics are computed using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals and are adjusted for the small-sample properties documented by Windmeijer. The table presents the value of incentives as predicted by the empirical results. All results are listed in raw value, as a percent of the sample mean, and as a percent of a one standard deviation move in the sample. For both Tobin's q and Operating Income-to-Capital, the elasticity of firm performance to incentive levels is taken from the full empirical specification including control variables in Table 3 . The median and average columns present the results implied for this elasticity evaluated at the median and average incentive levels for the sample. Windmeijer WC-robust estimator z-statistics in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Windmeijer WC-robust estimator z-statistics in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The table presents summary results of the dynamic panel regression of future firm value and income on current incentive levels and controls variables. DiscretionRatio, as described in Section 5.2 is a measure of CEO portfolio discretion, the degree to which exercisable and tradable securities comprise the incentive portfolio. Columns (1) and (3) contains CEO incentive level and discretion explanatory variables. . The full set of controls are used in columns (2) and (4). During estimation, all variables are treated as endogenous and a first difference transformation is used to eliminate fixed effects. Changes in incentives are instrumented with changes estimated using a industry peer index as described in Section 2. All other variables are instrumented with lagged levels. The M 2 tests for second order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. If this test yields a high p-value, second order autocorrelation is rejected and all level variables preceeding t − 2 are valid instruments. If the original model fails the M 2 test, it is subjected to a M 3 test, which checks for third order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. Passing this test indicates that all level variables preceeding t−3 are valid instruments. Z-statistics are computed using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals and are adjusted for the small-sample properties documented by Windmeijer. The table presents the value of incentives as predicted by the empirical results. All results are listed in raw value, as a percent of the sample mean, and as a percent of a one standard deviation move in the sample. For both Tobin's q and Operating Income-to-Capital, the elasticity of firm performance to incentive levels is taken from the full empirical specification including control variables in Table 3 . The median and average columns present the results implied for this elasticity evaluated at the median and average incentive levels for the sample. Windmeijer WC-robust estimator z-statistics in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Windmeijer WC-robust estimator z-statistics in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The table presents summary results of the dynamic panel regression of future firm value and income on current incentive levels and controls variables when firm founders are removed from the sample. Columns (1) and (3) contains a single control, incentive level. The full set of controls are used in columns (2) and (4). During estimation, all variables are treated as endogenous and a first difference transformation is used to eliminate fixed effects. Changes in incentives are instrumented with changes estimated using a industry peer index as described in Section 2. All other variables are instrumented with lagged levels. The M 2 tests for second order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. If this test yields a high p-value, second order autocorrelation is rejected and all level variables preceeding t − 2 are valid instruments. If the original model fails the M 2 test, it is subjected to a M 3 test, which checks for third order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. Passing this test indicates that all level variables preceeding t − 3 are valid instruments. Z-statistics are computed using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals and are adjusted for the small-sample properties documented by Windmeijer.
